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A Preface to Neoclassical Legal Thought
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Introduction
This preliminary essay explores the roots of fundamental changes in American
legal thought that began to take hold in the United States after Reconstruction. It is
written in contemplation of a larger project that is not yet finished. The term
“neoclassical legal thought” seems appropriate to describe this set of developments for
a number of reasons. First, neoclassical legal thought overlapped with but also
succeeded its predecessor, classical legal thought. Although the term classical legal
thought has been widely used in the literature of American legal history,1 the term
“neoclassical” legal thought has not been.2 Second, the relationship between classical
and neoclassical legal thought bears some important resemblances to the relationship
between classical political economy and classical economics.
Because we still live in an era that is predominantly neoclassical, 1970 is a moreor-less arbitrary stopping point. It brings this discussion up to, but not really into, the rise
of modern law and economics, deregulation, and the civil rights movements. The 1960s
is a watershed period because so many seminal, policy-shifting works were published
then, including James Landis’ Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President Elect
(1960), Coase’s “Problem of Social Cost” (1960), Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective
Action (1965), and Calabresi’s Cost of Accidents (1970), to mention a few. During the
same period legislative policy saw the Great Society and the 1960s civil rights

*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.

1

See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006);
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGH AND IDEOLOGY IN
AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 1870-1960, at 9-63 (1992); Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and
Morals in Classical legal Thought, 82 IOWA L.REV. 1427 (1997); PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979) (similar, earlier developments in Great Britain).
2

The only places it appears in the law review literature are in my own work. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Knowledge about Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and
Economics, 84 MINN.L.REV. 805, 823 (2000); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution
in Legal Thought, 46 VAND.L.REV. 305, 327 (1993).
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legislation. The first of these was the last gasp of New Deal social policy.3 The second
represented the triumph of environmentalism over Darwinian genetic determinism.
Classical legal thought was the dominant legal theory in the United States from
roughly the Civil War until the rise of Legal Realism and the Great Depression. Just as
classical political economy saw markets as largely self-executing, so too classical legal
theory believed that the law largely took care of itself, with only ad hoc intervention on
the part of the state, and then mainly through judges, who were the umpires of both
markets and the common law. In a very real sense Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of the
market, which made order out of the chaos of individual trading, was also the invisible
hand of the common law.
The marginalist revolution in economics changed that, initially for economics but
later and very profoundly for legal theory as well. Just as Darwinism, marginalism was
one of those great nineteenth century theories that every educated person was pretty
much forced to accept, regardless of ideology. For that reason marginalist economics
developed its own left and right wing ideologies. It became not only a technical
doctrine, but also a heavily political one. For example, in the twentieth century
marginalism provided the doctrinal underpinnings for the views that welfare can be
increased by transferring wealth from the well off to the poor, and also that markets are
fragile instruments requiring assistance from government regulation in the public
interest. However, only two decades later marginalism developed the views that,
setting aside monopoly and a few other cases of failure, markets work very well, and
free exchange is the only type of resource movement that can be shown to be efficient.
Further, government regulation is nothing more than a reflection of the wishes of the
most effective interest groups.
The marginalist revolution provoked a deep intellectual crisis in economics, and
during the decades from roughly 1875 to 1935 a great deal of fundamental economic
theory had to be written. The marginalist revolution in law was equally profound,
affecting every legal discipline, not just those that dealt expressly with commerce and
trade. Indeed, of the two most important Victorian ideas, Darwinism and marginalism,
the latter's influence on legal thought was much greater.
The title requires an explanation. I have published a few papers addressing this
topic before using the term “marginalist,” which is the strongest identifying characteristic
of neoclassical thought.4 I have also used the term “neoclassical.”5 While the term
3

For example, the Great Society was an “equal distribution” idea, while the Civil Rights statutes
were “equal opportunity” provisions that did not guarantee equal outcomes but only an equal
right to pursuit. An orthodox neoclassicist would dislike the first but embrace the second.
4

See The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305 (1993), and “The
Marginalist Revolution in Corporate Finance: 1880-1965” (SSRN, June, 2008).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873471

Hovenkamp, Neoclassical Legal Thought in the United States

July 2011, Page 3

“marginalist” is meaningful to economists and philosophers, it is not very helpful for a
more general audience and may in fact scare them off. The word “neoclassical” may
have the same effect, although the phrase “classical legal thought” is widely used in the
literature of American legal history, initially by Morton Horwitz and Duncan Kennedy,
and today by many others.6 Most historians speak of the period following classical
legal thought as “progressive legal thought.”
However, as this discussion will develop, the term “progressive” legal thought
creates an unwarranted bias in characterization. Neoclassicism is much broader,
embracing a number of ideologies and movements that clearly would have been
rejected by the progressives. It also creates the impression that conservatives clung to
an obsolete “classical” ideology, when in fact they were in many ways just as revisionist
as the progressives legal thinkers whom they critiqued. The Progressives7 and New
Deal thinkers whom we identify with progressive legal thought were nearly all
marginalists, but it is hardly the case that all marginalists were progressives. For
example, the law and economics movement is certainly neoclassical and vehemently
marginalist, but few people would place it into the category of progressive legal thought,
and its practitioners include some of the harshest critics of Legal Realism. The lawyers
and policy makers in the corporate finance battles of the 1920s, who advocated for the
abolition of par value stock and the adoption of more forward looking theories of
corporate valuation, were thoroughly marginalist in their reasoning, but by and large
they were regarded by Progressives as the enemy.
Indeed, corporate finance and minimum wage policies are areas where
progressive and corporation lawyers flipped against each other. On the minimum wage,
corporate interests generally clung to the classical and backward looking wage fund
theory which set an absolute limit on wages based on historically accumulated capital,
while progressives embraced a forward looking marginal productivity theory. By
contrast, in corporate finance the corporate interests generally rejected the view that
corporate value should be driven by historically paid in capital as reflected in stated
5

Herbert Hovenkamp, Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control, 4 VIRGINIA
J.L & BUS. REV. 374 (2009).
6

DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1975, 2006); MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1994); Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical
Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L.REV. 1513 (2001); William M. Wiecek, THE LOST WORLD OF
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Law and Morals in Classical Legal Thought, 82 IOWA L.REV. 1427 (1997).
7

The term “Progressive” with a capital P refers to the Progressive movement (roughly 18901920) as distinct from later liberal movements such as the New Deal. By contrast, “progressive”
refers to progressive legal thought generally, which is much broader in both scope and duration.
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“par” value of shares. Rather, they believed that stated corporate value should be
based on reasonable economic prospects, and that this made the concept of par value
obsolete.
Like Darwinism, marginalism was a big tent that fed different and inconsistent
ideologies. Describing the successor ideology to classical legal thought as
“progressive” does not do justice to the range of views that the successors had. For
example, Holmes was certainly post-classical and marginalist,8 but he was just as
certainly not progressive. Indeed, he was hostile to both reform and to legislation, two
things that progressive legal thought valued very highly. At any rate, I want to use a
title that does not suggest that the topic of this project is either overly obscure or overly
technical. Today we are all marginalists, even though many of us do not have a very
good understanding of what that term means.
A second problem has to do with the balance of theory and interest group power
in democratic policy making. Although the proposition should not be overstated,
intellectual historians tend to believe that ideas drive society’s values and even its
policy. Intellectual history, as opposed to social history, is often regarded as inherently
conservative because it uses published writings as source materials. Traditionally,
people who publish have been overwhelmingly elite, educated, white, and male. These
attributions are less true of the twentieth century than earlier periods, and intellectual
history today embraces gender, ethnic and cultural diversity much more than it did in the
1960s and earlier. In any event, intellectual history is an essential part of legal history,
which is unavoidably a study of published documents, most of which were written by
elites. Even radical or left leaning histories of law deal with the impact of published
legislation or legal opinion on others.
A more fundamental question involves, not the continued viability of intellectual
history as a discipline, but rather the relationship between ideas and policy. Today, we
are more inclined to think that policy is driven by interest group pressure. Interest
groups are motivated mainly by a search for wealth, well-being, or status, although
some are certainly driven by ideology as well. Within this model, ideas are often viewed
as little more than excuses that people in power use to rationalize their position.
Both the view that ideas count for nothing and that they count for everything9 are
overly simplisitic. Marginalist thought crossed ideological lines. Marginalist economics

8

On Holmes’ marginalism, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge about Welfare: Legal Realism
and the Separation of Law and Economics, 84 MINN.L.REV. 805 (2000).
9

On the latter view, see the conclusion of the great post-classical economist JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (“concluding notes”)
(1936):
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developed its own very powerful theories about policy making, and about the
relationship between interest groups and welfare. On one side, it led to progressivity in
tax policy, championed by Progressive marginalist economist Edwin R.A. Seligman; and
the idea that workers’ wages were limited by nothing more than the marginal
contribution of each worker to the employer. This was typically a much higher number
than subsistence required or that the classical wage fund theory argued as a natural
limit on wages. Marginalism’s strong environmentalism also eventually led to greater
egalitarianism in race policy, although that change was not reflected in the writing of the
Progressives, who attempted to be both marginalist and genetic determinist. On the
other side, marginalism also led to a comprehensive revision of corporate finance theory
and the modern theory of the large corporation, in which shareholders are all but
irrelevant. Marginalism also gave us public choice theory and its deep distrust of
government, developed in the work of Mancur Olson10 and Buchanan and Tullock11 in
the 1960s. The theory was derived directly from the model of perfect competition in
neoclassical economics, and the authors were all economists. The same thing is true of
Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, whose assumptions are very strict and include
both marginalist preference ordering and noncomparability of utilities.12 In sum, both
. .. the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is
ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in
authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic
scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately,
but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are
not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of
age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to
current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested
interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.
10

MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
11

JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
12

KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951; 2d ed. 1963). See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949
(1990) (offering a simple “proof” of the theorem). See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1291 & n. 271 (1994); Lynn Stout, Strict
Scrutiny and Social Choice: an Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect
Classifications, 80 GEO.L.J. 1787, 1795 (1992).
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the Progressive critique, which optimistically saw regulation as enacted in the public
interest, and the most cynical versions of public choice theory, are both completely
grounded in marginalist economics. Marginalist thinking drove both the pro-legislative
anti-common law reform missions of the Progressive Era and New Deal, and the promarket, pro-common law, anti-legislative and deregulatory counterreveolution that
largely occurred later.
An additional inquiry developed here concerns the role of formalism in legal
thought. Formalism occurs on courts when judges begin to think that the legal system
is “closed” in some important sense, or that the important questions have already been
answered. Formalism has two dominant explanations, one in intellectual history and
one which tends to dominate in social history. The intellectual history explanation,
which recalls the arguments of such people as Thomas Kuhn, Arthur Lovejoy, Joseph
Schumpeter, Merle Curti, or Richard Hofstadter,13 sees formalism mainly as a defensive
reaction to an intellectual “crisis.” That is to say, a big idea has been developed and is
widely accepted, but then is challenged from outside. Those supporting the status quo
respond by building an intellectual wall that excludes or ignores ideas that do not fit the
paradigm, or they develop rules that are governed strictly by premises that the paradigm
supports. This persists until the force of the new idea is so powerful that it eventually
breaks through.
The other perspective sees formalism mainly as what happens when a
dominant group achieves its political goals and then wants to “freeze” them in place.
Horwitz’s conclusion to The Transformation of American Law, entitled “The Rise of
Legal Formalism,” states such a conclusion very bluntly. As he explains, the most
powerful interests in American society were commercial ones who were frustrated by
the precommercial state of the common law at the time of the American revolution.
They developed a highly instrumental venture of transforming American law so as to
make it more commercial, less agrarian, and to favor entrepreneurship. By 1850 “that
transoformation was largely complete.” At that time
If a flexible, instrumental conception of law was necessary to promote the
transformation of the postrevolutionary American legal system, it was no longer
needed once the major beneficiaries of that transformation had obtained the bulk
of their objectives. There were, in short, major advantages in creating an
intellectual system which gave common law rules the appearance of being self
contained, apolitical, and inexorable, and which, by making “legal reasoning

13

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY,
THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1936); JOSEPH
SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1954); MERLE CURTI, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN THOUGHT (1943, REV. ED. 1951); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1860-1915 (1944).
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seem like mathematics,” conveyed “an air … of … inevitability about legal
deisions.”14
We generally think of formalism in law as something that dominated legal
thinking from sometime around the Civil War15 until the early decades of the twentieth
century, depending on where one looks. If one views Progressivism as a legislative
movement as signaling the end of formalism, then it ended early in the twentieth century
with the rise of large scale legislation concerning wages and hours and such federal
initiatives as the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906) and the creation of the federal Bureau
of Corporations (1903). By contrast, if one views the Supreme Court, which was both
much older and much more conservative than the population, it probably did not end
until Court packing (1937), although during much of this time the formalists carried the
day by very slim (often 5-4) margins. A case can be made that we are in a new age of
legal formalism on the Supreme Court. Some of the current Court’s attributes are eerily
similar to those of the early twentieth century court – namely, a Court that is sharply
divided, probably significantly more conservative than prevailing ideology, and
increasingly disparaging of scholarship that threatens its majority views, or that is
deemed excessively theoretical (to paraphrase some of CJ Roberts’ statements).16 One
important characteristic of formalism is defensiveness – that is, it represents an effort to
“lock in” a set of ideas that favors a dominant group and shield it from an outside attack.
That was certainly true in the Lochner era.
Neoclassicism is somewhat less conducive to formalism than classicism was,
however. Formalism is more difficult to discipline in a neoclassical regime. Classical
economic thought had an historical theory of value and a deep hostility toward state
interference in the economy. These views dominated the thought of all of the classicists
to one degree or another. As a result classicism never developed a pronounced “left”
and “right’ wing. Classicists tended to debate about details, or else about whether such
things as a high degree of economic and population development (England) or an
undeveloped economy and vast wilderness (America) made any difference to policy
making, but they agreed on most general principles. By contrast, marginalism has a
14

MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) at 253254, quoting Oliver William Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV.L.REV. 1, 7
(1894); and KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 38 (1960).

15

E.g., CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1871).

16

See David L. Schwartz and Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal
Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L.REV. 2011 (currently available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640681). The authors’ exhaustive
statistical study show that Chief Justice Roberts is factually wrong. In fact, the rate of
scholarship citation in legal opinions has steadily increased since the 1960s.
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forward looking (rational expectations) theory of value, which is much less stable, and
breaks apart into radically different views about the state and the market as social
institutions. As a result it has gyrated between differing political ideologies, and each of
these in turn has proven quite vulnerable to critique and change from within the
neoclassical system. Neoclassicism has a right wing and a left wing that are both
completely driven by marginalist principles. Indeed, some very prominent
neoclassicists, such as Alfred Marshall, Arthur Cecil Pigou or Joan Robinson in
England, or Richart T. Ely or John R. Commons in the United States, flirted with
socialism. Classicism never embraced such diversity.
As a result, yes, it does seem that we are experiencing a formalist period today,
at least on the Supreme Court and in many legislative bodies. However, formalism
today is not signaling the impending death of neoclassicism in the way that legal
formalism a century ago came about just as the classical model was falling apart. After
all, Justice Roberts’ critics are mainly neoclassical as well; they simply come from a
different room in the neoclassical tent.
.
PROGRESSIVE LEGAL POLICY AND THE MARGINALIST REVOLUTION
The Marginalist Revolution
Marginalism in economics is a theory that equates value with the next choice to
be made. A rational person chooses first what she wants most, second what she wants
second-most, and so on. The analogue of marginalism in philosophy is utilitarianism.
While utilitarianism was developed to a very high degree in the late eighteenth century,
it did not penetrate political economy for another century. For example, Jeremy
Bentham wrote about declining marginal utility and use of utility as a behavioral
constraint, already in the late eighteenth century.17 But classical political economy from
17

See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (c. 1793):
The quantity of happiness will not go on increasing in anything near the same proportion
as the quantity of wealth:--ten thousand times the quantity of wealth will not bring with it
ten thousand times the quantity of happiness. It will even be matter of doubt, whether ten
thousand times the wealth will in general bring with it twice the happiness. The effect of
wealth in the production of happiness goes on diminishing, as the quantity by which the
wealth of one man exceeds that of another goes on increasing: in other words, the
quantity of happiness produced by a particle of wealth (each particle being of the same
magnitude) will be less at every particle; the second will produce less than the first, the
third than the second, and so on."

Reprinted in 1 WERNER STARK, JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS: CRITICAL EDITION
BASED ON HIS PRINTED WORKS AND UNPRINTED MANUSCRIPTS 113 (1952). See also JEREMY
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Adam Smith through John Stuart Mill went about the study of economic value mainly by
looking at historical averages. For example, the value of market goods was thought to
be a function of the average cost of production. The value of wages was thought to be
a function of previous capital accumulation divided by the number of workers (the “wage
fund” theory).18 Indeed, Mill himself managed to be utilitarian in his philosophical theory
but classical in his economic theory, and began to see value in applying utilitarianism in
economics very late in his life. Before the theory of marginal utility could become
central to economics it had to be recast as a theory about how market prices are
determined and about the relationship between marginal utility (or value) and the
amount of something that is produced. That is, utilitarianism had to migrate from its
traditional position in ethics and political philosophy into the theory of exchange and
market behavior.
Beginning in the 1870s, economists in both England and the Continent began to
merge utilitarianism into economics by seeing value in terms of an economic decision
maker's willingness to pay for the next unit.19 Cost was important in determine whether
someone would produce and how much, but it did not determine value. The result was
stunning, leading to the division between "classical" and "neoclassical," and also
between the "political economy" of Adam Smith and his disciples, and the far more
mathematical "economics' of the turn of the twentieth century.20 On a perspective line,
the classicists and the marginalists stood back to back, the former always looking for a
theory of value based on averages taken from the past, the latter always identifying
value with rational expectations and the next thing.

BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, Part 1, Ch. 6 (first published 1802) (explaining
declining marginal utility of wealth and marginal deterrence).
18

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 193-199 (1991)

19

By common belief William Stanley Jevons (England), Carl Menger (Austria) and Leon Walras
(Switzerland) arrived at modern marginalism roughly simultaneously and also independently.
Whether they actually did so and the extent to which marginalism appeared earlier are widely
debated. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 277-310 (5th ed. 1996).
Schumpeter’s biased but brilliant account traces its origins mainly to Cournot and numerous
lesser authors who wrote in the first half of the nineteenth century. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 463 (1954). Among the earliest American marginalists were
John Bates Clark (Columbia), Irving Fisher (Yale), Francis Amasa Walker (Yale), and Simon
Newcomb (Johns Hopkins, mathematics).
20

A term popularized by the Marshalls in 1879. See ALFRED MARSHALL AND MARY PALEY
MARSHALL, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY (1879). See Lionel Robbins Richard T. Ely lecture,
“Economics and Political Economy,” 71 AM.ECON.REV. 1 (May, 1981).

Hovenkamp, Neoclassical Legal Thought in the United States

July 2011, Page 10

Marginalism invited many new concepts into economics, some almost
immediately and some that took several decades to develop. Most of them also invited
far greater use of both mathematics and, eventually, empirical observation. The most
important new concept was that if marginal utility declines rational decision makers will
equate utilities “at the margin.” That is, if people are not able to procure an infinite
amount of everything they will purchase each good they want until the marginal utility of
all are equal. For a simple illustration, suppose a person values bread by 10 for the first
loaf, 9 for the second loaf, 8 for the third, and so on. She also values meat by 8 for the
first pound, 6 for the second pound, 4 for the third pound, and so on. This person will
acquire bread and meat in some unknown amount (depending on her utility for all
goods) until the utilities of the two are the same. For example, having three loaves of
bread and no meat, the marginal utility of the fourth loaf of bread would be 7; the
marginal utility of the next (i.e., the first) pound of meat, would be 8. At this point adding
a loaf of bread would produce 7 units of increased utility while the meat will produce 8.
Having acquired the first pound of meat, however, the marginal utility of the next pound
would be 6, while bread is still 7. In “equilibrium,” a steady state in which all purchases
have been made, the marginal utility of all goods in this purchaser’s basket would be
precisely the same.
The second concept, which served to distinguish British utilitarianism from
marginalist economics, is that marginal utility theory provides a theory of market prices
and production, something that classical economy had not been able to do. Under
marginalism the value (willingness to pay) of each additional unit drops as buyers move
from higher to lower positions on their utility curve. That is, demand curves slope
downward. On the other side, “supply” moves upward. Producers maximizing their own
utility produce at the lowest cost first, starting out with their most efficient fields and
factories, and moving to less efficient resources as demand increases. For example,
suppose a farmer has good, average, and poor fields with production costs of 6, 8, and
10, respectively. If the anticipated market price is 9, the farmer will produce from the
first two fields but not the third. The market will be in “equilibrium” when the very last
good is produced at a cost just equal to the very last buyer’s willingness to pay. Thus
“price equals marginal cost” in a competitive market.
The third concept, which took decades to develop, is that while people and firms
are both economic actors, their choices are different in one important sense. While both
are “rational,” people maximize utility while firms maximize profits. Profits can be
measured by a metric such as dollars or pounds, which is both “cardinal,” in the sense
that the unit of measurement is constant and weighted ($10 will buy ten times as much
as $1), and comparable among different actors, which means that a dollar in the hands
of one firm is worth the same as a dollar in the hands of another. These twin facts of
cardinality and inter-actor comparability means that we can derive strong theories
about whether practices are efficient (value maximizing), what are the effects of dollar
transfers, and the like.
In contrast, biological persons maximize “utility,” a purely private standard that
does not provide a particularly useful unit of measurement. To be sure, greater wealth
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may entail greater utility, and vice-versa. But there is no reason for thinking that the
relationship is cardinal. Twice as much wealth might bring ten times as much utility, or
perhaps barely any increment at all. Further, different people cannot be assumed to
have identical utility functions. They can have very different preferences for goods and
even different preferences for dollars. “Ordinalism,” which came to dominate
neoclassical economics after the 1930s, was the extremely pessimistic view that
people’s true utility functions could never be quantified because they cannot be
observed. As a result, drawing broad conclusions about such issues as involuntary
wealth redistribution lay “outside the boundaries” of economic science.21
One consequence of this difference is that marginalism became much more
potent in business economics than it ever had been in political and ethical theory. The
earlier utilitarians largely knew that utilitarianism did not provide a calculus for
comparing one person’s utility with that of another, and this served to limit the
conclusions that could be drawn about social as opposed to individual values. By
contrast, business firms maximize profits and trade dollars, and the interpersonal
comparison problem largely goes away.
One result of the interpersonal comparability issue was the emergence of two
broad subdivisions in neoclassical economics. One, historically called “industrial
economics” (today, more commonly, “price theory” and “industrial organization”) was
concerned mainly with business firms and the movement of some constant currency
such as dollars. The other, “welfare economics,” was concerned manly with the efficacy
of markets as devices to increase human utility, and also with the various mechanisms
by which utility can be observed or social choices can be made through nonmarket
means.
These fundamental differences between classicism and neoclassicism in
economics rather quickly became blended into legal thought. For example, in
classicism value was a function of invested costs. For a neoclassicist value is a
function of willingness to pay, which was driven by expectations about performance in
the future. Because of its backward view, classicism tended to see markets and rules
as self-defining and self-executing. For example, historical cost is what it is. By
contrast, marginalists tended to see value in terms of rational expectations. While this
was much more realistic for many purposes, it was also subject to more assumptions,
more speculation, and thus more manipulation. As a result, marginalists early on saw a
much broader role for a regulatory state than the classicists did. It is no coincidence
that the first generation of marginalists were mainly the Progressives, and the second
generation were mainly the parents of the New Deal.
While classicists were individualists on questions about social ordering,
marginalists divided on the question, and liberals accepted a concept of “social” as well
as individual utility. More fundamentally, because of its backward looking perspective
21
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classicism tended to see value as part of nature and as beyond anyone’s power to alter
in fundamental ways. In sharp contrast, for neoclassicists value was a function of
human desire. Neoclassical theory was thus far more subjective and thus often
attacked by its critics of being hedonistic.22
In both economics and law the immediate impact of marginalist thinking was
serious doubts about the robustness of markets and purely private ordering through
exchange, and a correspondingly greater confidence in the state as regulator.
Marginalist economists gradually began a “reconstruction” period, however, that led to
more robust or at least more workable theories of competition, and also an interest
group theory that served to explain that government regulation was both more costly
and less productive than the earlier maginalists had thought. This set of developments
took about a half century. Its culmination was in the 1960s, with the publication of
Coase’s “Problem of Social Cost” in private economics and common law policy (1960).
1965 saw the publication of Mancur Olson’s Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, on the
political process and the theory of interest groups; James M. Landis’ pessimistic Report
on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect (1960) very largely undercut the
optimism about government regulation reflected in his own progressive 1938 book THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS. By the late 1970s the federal government began to oversee
the dismantling of much of the New Deal regulatory state.
Finally, marginalism brought about a change in both economic and legal
conceptions of “coercion.” Classical political economy had recognized two states:
competition and monopoly, and monopoly almost never existed unless the state created
an exclusive right.23 Under competition, by contrast everything and everyone moved
freely. By contrast, marginalism saw competition as existing in degrees, and mobility as
limited to the same extent. Beginning with Pigou and later with Coase, economists
began to emphasize the “costs of movement” (Pigou) or “transaction costs” (Coase) of
getting things or people from one spot to the next. Economics formed theories about
high fixed costs, market concentration and economies of scale, barriers to entry, access
to capital, and the costs of resource movement that could lead to forms of “market
coercion” as opposed to state-imposed coercion. One did not need exclusive grants of
privilege from the state in order to coerce.24 In the late 1920s Robert L Hale, an
22
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important forerunner of Legal Realism, applied these ideas to legal institutions by
evaluating the coerciveness of a state policy that did no more than protect property and
contract rights.25 Today Hale’s work is regarded as one of the great achievements of
early legal realism.
Marginalism and Darwinism
The two most important scientific ideas of the nineteenth century were Darwinism
and marginalism. Both became starting points for the great revolution in the social
sciences that took place in the 1870's and later. The central principle of Darwinism was
the theory of evolution by natural selection. Nature produces many more offspring than
the environment is able to accommodate. As a result, individuals must compete to
survive. Those who have inherited characteristics that give them a competitive
advantage tend to live long enough to have offspring. They pass these characteristics
on to future generations, who then continue the struggle.
The starting point for Darwinian analysis of the human individual was the
environment. Both the human organism and her behavior were a product of the
environment, shaped over many generations. Its choices were determined entirely by
surroundings. By contrast, marginalism began with the human as an autonomous
decision maker.
Darwinism is mainly an empirical concept. Darwin developed the theory of
natural selection after many years of scientific observation, and his famous work On the
Origin of Species (1859) attempted to prove its truth by overwhelming the reader with
empirical evidence. By contrast, marginalism is an analytic concept. Indeed, it cannot
be "verified" at all. We can observe choices but not states of mind.
Nevertheless, there is no inherent conflict between Darwin and marginalism.
Early American social scientists such as Edward A. Ross viewed them as
complementary rather than competing models of human behavior. One can readily
imagine a unified conception of behavioral science in which evolutionary theory
addressed issues about the formation of human motives and preferences, and
marginalist mathematics rationalized the way they are asserted, and also developed
models of business firm behavior. What actually developed was something far different.
Darwinian scientists after the World War I developed models in which human action was
seen as nothing more than a consequence of evolution and response to the
environment. They emphasized that the successful individuals in a particular
25
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environmental niche tend to have common characteristics and reactions. Variations
were random and most led to an early death, although a few increased the odds of
survival. With Darwin’s The Descent of Man (1871) and the development of Darwinian
anthropology these views were extended to individual choices and common social
practices.26 Indeed, the behaviorist psychology that developed around the time of
World War I believed that the concepts of choice and even consciousness were
scientifically meaningless.27
Thus Darwinians tended to believe humans had no choice about preferences;
they were built in as part of the instinct to survive. The principal difference between
human beings and the simplest lower organisms is that humans have the power to
reflect about preferences. The led many progressive social scientists to believe that the
state could make “objective” welfare judgments based on external criteria such as
health or education. Darwinism told the progressive, whether economist, psychologist
or other social scientist, that basic human needs and desires were determined
principally by the environment. Further, the things we call "preferences," at least at
some level, were those things necessary for survival. The structure of human
preference was a product of evolution just as much as his straight spine and his
cognitive abilities. As a result, one could discern preferences by studying human
evolution or even the environment itself. For the so-called "Reform Darwinists" (as
opposed to the Social Darwinists) this model permitted Progressive era economists to
speak of "social" as well as individual wants.28
In sharp contrast, neoclassicists increasingly came to think that human beings
asserting preferences were acting autonomously. By the 1930s and after, marginalist
economists did not purport to care about where preferences came from, but took them
as given. The entire enterprise of trying to find a common structure that linked the
26
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preferences of different individuals together was not within economic science. Indeed,
neoclassical ideas about choice became ever more stripped down until the only
qualities that could be ascribed to them is that they must be capable of being asserted
over the entire relevant range and that they must be rational, or transitive.29
In sum, to a very large extent economics and the Darwinian social sciences each
adopted scientific methodologies that tended to regard the methodology of the other as
unscientific. Further, lurking behind all of this was the nature-nurture controversy, in
which Darwinism historically was seen as strongly supporting nature, while marginalists
were really not interested in nature, but only in the assertion of individual human choice.
Marginalism became the perfect vehicle for nurture based theories of social control.
Darwinism has had a much more important role than marginalism in the writing of
intellectual history, including legal history. For example, marginalism has no equivalent
of Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in American Thought (1944), one of the most
famous books of United States intellectual history of all time. Evangelical ministers in
the first half of the twentieth century did not preach sermons attacking marginalism they
way they did Darwinism, even though marginalism produced just as many threats to
historical Christian principles. Of course, the thing that gave Darwinism its notoriety
was the thesis that humankind descended from lower primates, a heresy that
marginalism’s hedonism could not match in the evangelical outrage that it produced.30
Darwinism and marginalism had a common starting point: scarcity in relation to
the population. Indeed both claimed the classical political economist Sir Thomas
Malthus’ as an intellectual parent.31 Darwin’s theory of survival was entirely driven by
the proposition that nature produces many more organisms than the environment is
29
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able to support. As became most apparent in the work of Lionel Robbins, neoclassical
economics was a theory about how people make choice in a world of scarce resources
which have alternative possible uses.32
Darwinism and Marginalism developed profoundly different views about social
control. For Darwinists (both Social and Reform) the human individual is largely what
he is at birth; one can improve the species through cultivation, but not the individual.33
By contrast, for the marginalists reforming behavior was always about governing
incentives at the margin. For example, a Darwinist would address the problem of
criminal behavior by seeking out genetic traits that were thought to signal it and using
sterilization or other methods to prevent these individuals from reproducing.34 These
views were readily extended to race, although in the United States they showed up not
as an argument for mass sterilization but rather for prohibitions on interracial marriage.35
By contrast, marginalists applied penalties and rewards to living individuals in order to
create incentives. For a period of time during the Progressive Era both of these
methods were widely practiced, but the marginalist view eventually won out.
United States Constitutional doctrines such as substantive due process have
widely been believed to be an expression of Social Darwinism in the United States.
That is how the intellectual history during the period 1930-1970 portrayed them,36 and
32
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the idea still claims occasional supporters. Nothing could be further from the truth,
however. The authors of Lochner (Rufus Peckham), Adkins (George Sutherland), the
Four Horsemen (Justices Sutherland as well as VanDevanter, Butler & McReynolds)
were not Social Darwinists and, for that matter, probably not Darwinists at all. The
origins of Substantive Due Process lay entirely in classical political economy.37 This
strong view of liberty of contract from state interference gave way to marginalist liberal
views in the 1930s, but gradually returned to Constitutional jurisprudence in the 1960s
and after, as the neoclassical model became more favorably inclined toward markets
and less favorable toward government intervention. Liberty of contract is fundamentally
an economic, not an evolutionary, doctrine.
Law and Economics During the Age of Material Welfare
The initial consequence of the adoption of marginalism in economics was a shift
in policy concern to two things: the regulation of incentives and distributive justice.
Another consequence, equally profound, was a steep decline in the status of the market
as a wealth allocation device. Following Alfred Marshall, the marginalists adopted their
scientific principles from mechanics and were obsessed with the way that trading moved
toward an "equilibrium" in which maximum wants were satisfied. This search for the
conditions of equilibrium found many impediments that seemed to cry out for
government intervention. As a result, many prominent British marginalists prior to the
1930s became socialists and at least one, Cambridge University Professor Joan
Robinson, flirted with Marxism.38 Many American marginalist economists during the
Progressive Era developed a profound distrust in markets to allocate resources properly
In the United States the first three decades of the century produced a spate of
books and articles on the relationship between economic science and the law, and a
surprising number of legislative responses. In general, the members of this first law and
economics movement were much more enthusiastic about legislation than the members
of the post-sixties movement that we today identify by the term "law and economics."
The earlier group tended to believe that market failure was widespread, thus justifying
government intervention, and that the state could increase welfare by transferring
wealth from wealthier to poorer members of society.39
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Individual vs. Social Welfare: Criminal Law, Tax Policy, and Race
Marginalism as an economic theory showed up in Progressive Era legal policy in
many ways. Among the most important were the adoption and use of deterrence
theories in criminal law, the use of a graduated income tax and differential taxation as a
wealth redistribution device, and somewhat later, increasingly benign attitudes about
race.
On tax policy, the use of a graduated income tax was an exercise in the pure
mathematics of marginalism. In particularly was the Progressive concern that if taxes
on the wealthy were not allocated in the right way they would simply be passed on to
the poor through the price system. For example, a sales tax is typically assessed
against sellers, who normally add it to the price of the sale Edwin R.A. Seligman was
the Progressive Era champion of the economics of passing on (“shifting”) and identifying
the social group upon whom a tax burden ultimately fell (“incidence”).40 Seligman’s
views rested on the premise that total welfare could be increased by shifting resources
from the wealthy to the poorer, a proposition that much of neoclassical economics came
to reject in the 1930s and later.
The story of marginalism and race is more complex because genetics played
such an important role in race theory in the United States prior to the New Deal.
Indeed, the extent to which Progressives could be quite interventionist in behalf of the
poor but also so thoroughly racist is discomfiting.41 Indeed, in an important sense
Progressive Era racism was far worse than racism in a more laissez faire economy,
because explicit racism incorporated into programs for social engineering.
Revisionism in Torts, Contract and Property
The term “common law” needs to be qualified when speaking of the twentieth
century. Many of the revisions were statutory.
Tort theory was very poorly developed prior to the middle of the nineteenth
century, largely because it lacked focus, something that the rise of negligence theory
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provided.42 But Shearman and Redfield’s treatise on negligence was not published until
1869, and Holmes’s unifying essays on tort theory came yet later.43 Holmes’ objective
theory (“external standard”) reflected pure marginalism in tort law. In largely Benthamite
fashion, Holmes argued that the law is not concerned with mental states but rather with
regulation of conduct, and that penalties should be adjusted in order to provide
incentives or disincentives to certain types of conduct. As a result, it should meter
penalties according to the foresight of the hypothetical reasonable person. Holmes’
principal objection to strict liability was that it did not fit into a utilitarian framework. In
his view, liability without fault did not provide appropriate incentives.44 The revival of
strict liability in products cases in the 1940s45 came about mainly after commentators
began to see that strict liability can in fact be quite effective at creating appropriate
incentives in certain contexts, such as when a manufacturer controls its entire
production process (making negligence virtually impossible to prove), strict liability
requires a firm to internalize its costs, and that the costs themselves can be distributed
across the market in the form of insurance.
One significant marginalist development in tort theory was the displacement of
the classical theory of scientific causation with foreseeability, leading some Legal
Realists to complain that negligence and causation (or at least proximate cause) were
being governed by the same test.46 Marginalist tort law came to be dominated by a
marginal deterrence theory that forced actors to internalize the foreseeable harmful
consequences of their actions. That theory served to explain intentional torts,
negligence of all degrees, and strict liability. It was encapsulated in Judge Hand’s
articulation in Carroll Towing that an action is negligent if the anticipated cost of taking a
precaution is less than the expected harm cause by the accident. In other words,
negligence consists in a failure to take cost justified precautions, measured ex ante.47
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The Second Restatement of Torts (mainly, 1970s), largely restated tort law in terms of
management of perceived risks.
The marginalist revolution in contract law consisted mainly in the rejection of a
“will’ or subjective “meeting of the minds” theory of contract and its replacement by an
objective, or “external’ standard (Holmes and Williston).48 But the rise of objectivism
carried with it a realization that contract interpretation no longer depended on the
subjective will of the parties, but rather on objective constructs that were inevitably
normative in character. Just as an objective standard for negligence in tort law led to
normative standards (“loss minimizing”), so too objective standards in contract led to
normative standards that included both the facilitation of ordinary transactions and a
growing sense that coercion, as the Legal Realists used that term, could be present
even in voluntary exchange. The inevitable result was that contract law developed a
greater sensitivity to inequality of bargaining position and duress.49
The other thing that happened in contract law, and that was more explicitly driven
by industrial economics, was the displacement of the classical theory that a contract is
an event that occurs at a single instant in time.50 The rise of more complex distribution
systems and the increased appreciation of the role of transaction costs and
specialization of trading partners led to increased accommodation of contractual
agreements of longer duration and with more complex and open ended terms. The
result was the development of a “neoclassical” theory of contract that acknowledged a
larger variety of arrangements, and with less formality, as contractual.51 Equally
important from a business point of view was the rise of the long-term “relational”
contract, which contemplated far more open-endedness. For example, Samuel
Williston wrote this in his 1920 treatise on contracts:
A promise to buy such a quantity of goods as the buyer may thereafter order,
or to take goods in such quantities “as may be desired,” or as the buyer “may
want” is not sufficient consideration since the buyer may refrain from buying at
his option and without incurring legal detriment himself or benefiting the other
party. A few courts additionally held the contracts invalid if they did not require
the buyer to take exclusively from the seller, because then the buyer could
effectively stay in business but purchase nothing. By contrast, others enforced

48

SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).

49

E.g., ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1950).

50

The topic is developed more fully in the chapters on competition policy and vertical
integration.

51

Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic. Relations Under Classical
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).

Hovenkamp, Neoclassical Legal Thought in the United States

July 2011, Page 21

the contracts when they did in fact require the buyer to take all of its
requirements from the seller.52
Within a few decades, however, courts routinely enforced not only exclusive
dealing” contracts that did not specify the quantity, but even long-term franchise
contracts that permitted the price, the quantity, and even the goods to be sold to be
subsequently specified by the franchisor. The contract had become a substitute for the
vertically integrated firm.53
Real property became by far the most comprehensively regulated land use
market prior to the New Deal. The land use regulation upheld by the Supreme Court in
the Euclid case in 1926 specified uses, heights, and densities with respect to
construction on privately owned land. It was also jurisprudentially anomalous because
the Supreme Court permitted comprehensive zoning to go forward in an era in which it
was striking down all types of regulation. Justice Sutherland, who found regulation of
minimum wages for women to be beyond the state’s police power, believed that urban
land was persistently subject to market failure, a distinctly neoclassical notion, making
regulation acceptable.54 That case set the stage for a great debate over the efficacy of
private bargaining as opposed to government regulation in land use. Fundamentally,
the law and economics movement originated in a dispute that was heavily about using
the market driven common law of nuisance rather than regulatory intervention in order
to control harmful land uses.55
Institutionalism, Legal Realism, and Democratic Government
Market Failure, Constitutional Interpretation, and Administrative Law
One characteristic of formalism is confidence – one might even say arrogance—
about an established model. There are no big pieces left to be filled in, but only details.
That describes the relationship between classical political economy and Lochner.
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An important characteristic of marginalism, however, was renewed doubt about
the efficacy of markets and the propriety of government intervention. By the 1930s
marginalist economics had produced significant theory suggesting that markets are in
fact feeble instruments, easily manipulated and subject to a great deal of coercion in the
presence of private economic power.56 The theory also suggested, however, that
markets differed significantly from one another, and that there was no single right
answer to problems of market failure.
In Constitutional adjudication of economic regulation, the result was a complete
loss of confidence in the classical proposition that markets, left untouched, were robust,
and that regulation was highly likely to be little more than a favor paid to a special
interest group. A regime that favored experimentation necessarily deferred much more
heavily to legislative judgments about the proper regulatory approach, and
administrative law promised a value mixture of expertise, quasi-legislative power, and
quasi-judicial authority.57
Institutionalism and Legal Realism
The Institutionalists were a group of economic dissidents who worked mainly in
the United States from the beginning of the twentieth century (Thorstein Veblen) until
the New Deal. Some of them, such as Veblen, opposed marginalist analysis. Others,
including John R. Commons and John Maurice Clark, were enthusiastic marginalists.
What they all shared however, was early marginalism's distrust of markets, the notion
that economic analysis should examine economic decision making in very small
markets (e.g., firms, families, local governments), and a fairly heady optimism about
government regulation as a corrective.58
The Legal Realists were, in essence, the legal branch of Institutionalism. Indeed,
many of the Realists crossed over between law and economics, but the economics that
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they embraced was invariably a form of institutionalism.59 Once the impact of the
ordinalist revolution in economics set in, their economic theory became largely regarded
as obsolete. Further, once the theory of perfect competition and market failure became
formalized their views about regulation came to be regarded as obsolete as well.
These facts are key to understanding the place of Legal Realism in American
legal thought. Today, some people regard them as early proponents of law and
economics, while others think of them as strongly hostile. The fact is that they were
proponents of a kind of law and economics, but their thought coincided with a particular
type of economic reasoning, institutionalism, that was relatively short lived and did not
survive the reconstruction of a much more market based neoclassicism that began after
World War II.

Ordinalism and the Human Production Function
"Ordinalism," or the ordinalist revolution, originated mainly at the London School
of Economics in the early to mid-1930s, although many other economists had
recognized the issue. The ordinalist revolution created a sharp divided within
neoclassical economics that had immediate, powerful implications for legal policy
making of all kinds. Marginalists up to the 1930s believed with various degrees of
confidence that the principle of “equality at the margin” (see Chapter 1) applied across
persons, not merely to an individual’s personal choices. Indeed, if everyone had
identical utility functions welfare would be maximized when everyone had exactly the
same amount of utility. But of course people have different preferences, and that raised
the issue of how utilities can be compared across persons.
Relying heavily on logical positivism and the writings of the Vienna Circle, Lionel
Robbins developed what became the dominant view, which was that because
subjective mental states regarding utility cannot be observed in any sense that permits
interpersonal comparison, no scientific conclusions could be drawn about them.
Robbins wrote:
… suppose that we differed about the satisfaction derived by A from an income
of 1,000, and the satisfaction derived by B from an income of twice that
magnitude. Asking them would provide no solution. Supposing they differed. A
59
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might urge that he had more satisfaction than B at the margin. While B might
urge that, on the contrary, he had more satisfaction than A. We do not need to be
slavish behaviourists to realise that here is no scientific evidence. There is no
means of testing the magnitude of A's satisfaction as compared with B's. If we
tested the state of their blood-streams, that would be a test of blood, not
satisfaction. Introspection does not enable A to discover what is going on in B's
mind, nor B to discover what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing the
satisfactions of different people.60
Robbins Essay started a firestorm in economic theory, with a move toward the
use of more empirical surrogates for utility, such as revealed preference.61 Ordinalism
also signaled the start a “recovery” process in which neoclassical economics gradually
moved once again to a much more limited view of the role of the state in the economy
that limited intervention to the correction of market failures rather than some conception
of distributive justice. In legal policy the ground was to shift even further. Indeed, ideas
to the effect that greater equality of wealth produces greater aggregate welfare have
been virtually banished from legal policy making.
Robbins’ argument can be subjected to a number of criticisms, but interestingly
they have attained more traction within economics and philosophy than they have in
legal policy. One criticism is the same one that came to be made of the Vienna Circle’s
own “verification principle,” which states that a non-analytic proposition has only that
meaning that results from verification (thus Robinson’s statement about blood
streams).62 As later critics of logical positivism pointed out, the verification principle
flunks its own test to the extent that it purports to describe how the world works and is
not merely definitional.63
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A second criticism, quite relevant to policy making, is that ordinalism is based on
a strict definition of welfare as subjective preferences, which are of course inherently
unverifiable in that no one can measure another’s state of mind. But policy making and
economic practice have always relied on “objective” welfare judgments. For example, a
farmer knows nothing about livestock’s “state of mind,” but uses objective indicia of
productivity, freedom from disease, and so on. Further, the farmer interested in
maximizing productivity (and who presumably knows nothing of marginalism) does not
heap a disproportionate amount of available resources on one or a small number of
head but rather equalizes them , perhaps with some proportioning according to
individual size or other observed conditions. In sum, even the farmer applies the
principles of diminishing returns and equality at the margin.
A third criticism is that Robbins definition ignored decades of evolutionary theory
to the effect that “preferences” are nothing more than survival instincts, and that within
the survival range they tend to be quite uniform from one (successful) organism to
another. By treating individual preferences as radically indeterminate Robbins
completely severed the connection between economics and evolutionary theory insofar
as they purported to say something useful about human motivation.
Finally, and also important for public policy, Robbins theory of welfare – indeed,
his entire definition of economics – is based entirely on consumption, not on production.
It took no account of the role of human productivity, or “human capital,” in the creation of
value. Writing in the late 1920s Arthur C. Pigou had observed:
There is such a thing as investment in human capital as well as investment in
material capital. So soon as this is recognised, the distinction between economy
in consumption and economy in investment becomes blurred. For, up to a point,
consumption is investment in personal productive capacity. This is especially
important in connection with children: to reduce unduly expenditure on their
consumption may greatly lower their efficiency in after-life. Even for adults, after
we have descended a certain distance along the scale of wealth, so that we are
beyond the region of luxuries and "unnecessary" comforts, a check to personal
consumption is also a check to investment.64
In sum, to the extent that government welfare policy is interested in productivity,
its goal would be to produce productive citizens rather than states of mind reflecting
maximum utility. This means investment in things such as food, clothing, shelter and
education, understanding that the law of diminishing returns applies.
The Neoclassical Business Firm
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The Revolution in Corporate Finance
Classical theory since the administration of Andrew Jackson strongly favored the
business corporation as a device for amassing and deploying the capital of multiple
shareholders. But it could also be an instrument of deception when managers
overstated corporate value in order to induce high share prices or favorable loan rates.
Under the classical theory of corporate finance the value of a corporation was its paid in
capital, a backward looking amount. Stock was issued at a "par" value that reflected
this amount. For example, if a firm issued 10,000 shares at a par value of $5, those
numbers represented the incorporator’'s assurance that the firm held $50,000 of paid in
capital. Stock was said to be "watered" when these numbers were exaggerated -- for
example, when controlling owners put real property or other assets into the corporation
at greatly overstated values.65 Early Progressives made a career writing about the
great “watered stock” controversies of the Gilded Age and early twentieth century.
One important value of classical finance theory was its susceptibility to
measurement by tools available to any commercially literate judge. The classical
corporation contemplated a system that was self executing and administered by courts,
with the Secretary of State of another state official as prosecutor. At the same time,
however, the classical theory seems to have very little to do with the current market
value of a corporation, which is driven by expectations of profit rather than the amount
previously paid in. Under marginalism corporate valuation is forward rather than
backward looking. A firm with an enormous paid up investment in an obsolete
technology might be worthless, while another firm with a small investment but a market
shifting innovation might be worth a fortune. Beginning in the 1910s corporate finance
theorists began to argue that prospects of future profits rather than previous investment
should drive corporate valuation.66 This led to the dropping of “par” as an attribute of
corporate valuation.67
The neoclassical theory of corporate finance was a much more realistic way to
estimate corporate value, but it also came with its problems. The neoclassical theory
depended on a firm's prospects rather than its history, and prospects were much more
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amenable to speculation.68 This change placed a greater premium on the good faith
and reasonable expectations of managers and also required much greater detail and
accuracy in corporate reporting. This change in conception, coupled with the massive
business firm bankruptcies that occurred in the early 1930s, cried out for more
aggressive regulation, which largely came at the federal level in the early 1930s.

The Separation of Ownership and Control
The "separation of ownership and control" is almost always associated with
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means "The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(1932), sometimes called the "economic bible of the New Deal.” Nevertheless, the
concept dated back much earlier and was well established in the writings of Thorstein
Veblen a decade earlier.69 Indeed, the idea stretches all the way back to Adam Smith’s
observation in The Wealth of Nations that business managers of “other people’s money”
did not have the same incentives as those managing their own.70
What is too often unappreciated is that the separation of ownership control as an
idea about corporate structure was embraced by orthodox neoclassical economists just
as much as by left-leaning institutionalists. The main difference was attitude. Berle and
Means saw the separation of ownership and control as the source of corporate
aggrandizement, inefficiency, and social irresponsibility. By contrast, neoclassicists
ranging from Irving Fisher (Yale), Ronald Coase to Modigliani-Miller and Eugene Fama
saw the separation of ownership and control as an essential key to corporate efficiency.
Fisher’s separation theorem, developed at the beginning of the twentieth century,
showed that under its assumptions the profit function of a corporation could not be
derived from the utility functions of its shareholders.71 Ronald Coase’s article on “The
68
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Nature of the Firm,” contemporary with Berle and Means, established criteria for firm
profit maximization in which the independent role of shareholders was entirely
irrelevant.72 The Modigliani-Miller theorem in the 1950s, showed that under appropriate
assumptions the value of a firm is invariant to its debt to equity ratio.73 That is,
ownership of the business firms is nothing more than an alternative way of getting
financing. Finally, the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) of the 1960s held
that, under appropriate assumptions firm value at any given instant reflects the sum of
knowledge about the firm’s prospects.74 To the extent that the capital market is
efficient, individual investors’ attempts to “beat the market” will fail. The result was the
increased popularity of index investing and technical trading – situations in which a
firm’s “owners” typically cannot even name the corporation’s CEO or identify the
products that it sells. Indeed, in the case of index funds investors typically do not even
know which stocks they “own.”
The Crisis in Competition Policy
The immediate result of marginalism in industrial economics was protracted
study of the conditions under which markets would perform competitively, and an early
realization that the conditions for perfect competition were very rare or nonexistent.
This provoked first in England and a little later in the United States a strong distrust of
markets and a corresponding belief that government corrections must be applied
liberally and across a broad spectrum of situations. The view showed up in two areas.
One was antitrust. The other was judgments about the appropriate scope and nature of
government regulation.
The implications for antitrust policy in the United States was a great deal of
intervention, a strong distrust of market concentration (markets with a small number of
firms), a belief that “barriers to entry” were widespread and precluded competition in
many market, a deep suspicion of product differentiation, and a strong distrust of
patents. In 1940 John Maurice Clark attempted to bring some order out of this with a
highly influential plea for “workable competition.”75 The reigning belief about market
structure and competition was the so called “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm,
under which a particular market structure dictated a particular kind of conduct, which in
turn dictated a particular kind of performance. As a result, conduct dropped out as an
72
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independent variable of interest and antitrust policy makers attempted to go after
structure directly. The result was an antitrust policy broadly dedicated to revising the
structure of American industry by making firms smaller and more numerous.76
Vertical Integration and the Relational Contract
This chaper continues and expands some of the developments treated in the
chapter on the common law and contracts. One component in the perceived decline in
competition was a suspicion of vertical integration, or situations where a firm might
engage in two different levels of production, such as manufacturing and distribution or
retailing. But the fear also showed up in a deep seated suspicion of contractual
distribution mechanisms such as franchising. As a result antitrust developed aggressive
rules about tying, exclusive dealing, and resale price maintenance that were often
brought to bear against practices that today we would consider to be competitively
harmless or benign. As a result the modern American distribution system, a wonder to
behold, largely developed in spite of rather than because of American competition
policy. Moreover, in order to develop modern franchising entrepreneurs had to get over
some relatively high common law hurdles. For example, the common law as restated in
Samuel Williston’s highly influential treatise on contracts (1920) was hostile toward
exclusive dealing contracts or other long term arrangements in which the relationship
between the parties was ongoing but price and quantity were not established. However,
the essene of contractual distribution schemes are long term contractual relationship in
which prices and products that move from manufacturers to dealers are continually
changing.
Against all of this Ronald Coase in 1937 wrote what was eventually to become a
very influential article on “The Nature of the Firm” that found a perfectly benign
explanation for vertical integration. Coase observed that use of the market has a cost.
A firm bent on maximizing its profits will therefore always seek out the lowest cost
means of doing something. For example, if it is cheaper for General Motors to purchase
auto bodies it will buy them. If it is cheaper to make them itself it will do so. The
aggregation of all of these decision determines the vertical boundaries of the firm.
Coase’s article, by his own observation, was virtually ignored for a quarter century. But
in the 1950s the hostility toward vertical integration began to diminish as legal policy
began to countenance its great potential for efficiency and lower prices.77
Law, Technology, and the Inventive Step
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The Patent Act had always required that before something could be patented it
must be novel – that is, different from anything that already existed in the prior art.
However, the 1952 Patent Act added the additional requirement that this thing be
“nonobvious” – that is, sufficiently different from the prior art that a person with “ordinary
skill” would not likely have seen it.78 While novelty is a backward looking concept,
nonobviousness looks forward, reflecting the foresight of the unusually gifted person.
Further, it creates a vast amount of uncertainty because it requires the patent system to
predict what is foreseeable.79
The Public Good, Social Cost and the Legal System
Economic and Regulatory Legislation
The rise and fall of the regulatory state very largely tracked prevailing
neoclassical economics, with the legal policy lagging the economic theory by a
generation or so. The first three generations of marginalists were generally suspicious
of markets, finding that the conditions for perfect competition failed much more often
than not, and that many manufacturing firms engaged in practices that either seemed
anticompetitive or were not easily explained away. For example, Cambridge economist
Joan Robinson closed her influential book on imperfect competiton with a chapter
entitled “A World of Monopolies,” remarking that monopoly of a certain kind was indeed
much more common than the classicists had thought.80 By the same token,
neoclassicists through World War II regarded government regulation as a favorable
alternative. Within legal policy these views are strongly reflected in Progressivism, the
New Deal, the rise of agency administrative law and the growing hostility toward
common law adjudication.
Beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the 1960s, however, neoclassical
economics went through a process that involved the gradual rehabilitation of private
markets and a belief that most of them could work tolerably well, if not perfectly. At the
same time, both economists and legal writers became increasingly saw significant
imperfections in the regulatory process. First, it seemed very costly in relation to
relatively poor results, a point that James M. Landis brought home in his Report on
Regulatory Agencies to President-elect Kennedy. Landis’ report was influential
because a generation earlier he had been the author of the far more optimistic book,
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The Administrative Process.81 Eventually, beginning in the late 1970s, the federal
government adopted a broad policy of “deregulation,” in some cases eliminating entire
agencies (Civil Aeronautics Board, Interstate Commerce Commission), and in other
cases changing the rules so as to permit firms greater opportunity to enter markets, set
their own prices, or introduce new products without significant agency review.
Also, beginning in the 1960s a group of economists began to apply neoclassical
economic theory82 to “political” markets, and the result was not pretty. Economic
theories about private trading in competitive markets tended to show efficient outcomes.
By contrast, political markets tended to show either interest group capture or unstable
cycling.83 The effect was that, to a surprising degree, the classical political economists’
trust in private markets and distrust of government intervention, was restored.
The Rise of Modern Law and Economics
Arthur C. Pigou at Cambridge was the first economist to write extensively about
the cost of moving resources from one portion of the economy to another.84 In “The
Nature of the Firm” (1937) and again in “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960), Ronald
Coase focused on one particular cost of movement, namely bargaining or “transaction
costs,” arging that transaction costs are what makes a legal system relevant in a world
in which economic efficiency is the exclusive concern of legal policy.85 Stated most
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simply, the Coase theorem says that markets without transaction costs will trade to
efficiency. Within this paradigm, the role of the legal system is to minimize transaction
costs, in part by assigning legal entitlements in such a way that further bargaining about
them is unnecessary. Considering transaction costs often serves to make market much
smaller because very small groups often can have bargaining issues with one another.
This includes the single doctor and confectioner who had a dispute with one another in
London over the confectioner’s operation of noisy equipment.86 It also includes a single
married couple getting a divorce; partners contemplating dissolution or contractual
modification; a tortfeasor and its likely or actual victim; or the dozen home owners
downwind from a polluting smokestack. Descriptively, this suggested that many
arrangements (everything from firms to marriages to patent pools to vertical integration)
are best understood as devices for reducing transaction costs. On the normative side, it
suggested that legal policy should generally assign losses to the person who can avoid
them at least cost (e.g., title recording is cheaper than title searching; in product
manufacture the producer can avoid the loss at least cost; in product use, the operator
can do so; and so on). The debate over law and economics begain mainly in tort law
and nuisance, which is a concept of both tort and property law. In 1970 Guido
Calabresi’s book on The Cost of Accidents reintroduced a broader conception of costs
of movement by arguing that a system concerned with minimizing the costs of accidents
would seek to minimize the sum of (1) losses from accidents; (2) precaution costs; and
(3) the costs of running the legal system for administering responsibility and recovery.87
The law and economics movement is certainly the most influential legal
movement in the United States since World War II, and has also had more influence on
judges and legislators than any other ideology. Perhaps this is a result of the
movement’s own intellectual force, but perhaps its influence rests on the fact that
conservatives have tended to have the political power and they tend to favor most of its
conclusions. At the same time, however, law and economics has moderated
ideologically since its inception, and today has both strictly neoclassical and behaviorist
branches.
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